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2Adrian W. Throop*
Although a major objective ofcurrentfiscal policy is to stimulate
capital formation and productivity growth, the policy is internally
inconsistentfor this purpose. On the one hand, investment in plant
and equipment has been promoted by accelerated depreciation al-
lowances and liberalized investment tax credits. On the other, the
costofcapital is being raised by the impactoflarge federal demands
for credit on interest rates. Econometric simulations ofthe effects
of alternative fiscal policies indicate that the net effect of current
fiscal policy is actually to stimulate consumption rather than
investment.
In 1981, the Reagan Administration em-
barked upon a bold program for dealing with
the problems ofhigh inflation and stagnant eco-
nomic growth. Over the two previous decades,
the inflation rate in the U.S. economy had risen
from near zero to double digit levels, and the
rate of growth of labor productivity had fallen
from an average of around 2.5 percent per year
in the 1950s and early 1960s to about 0.5 per-
cent in the late 1970s. The Administration's
program consisted of tax and spending reduc-
tions as wen as regulatory reform to stimulate
saving, investment and work effort, and a com-
mitment to monetary stability to bring the rate
of inflation down.
A main feature of the Administration's fiscal
policy was the set oftax incentives for business
investment provided in the Economic Recovery
and Tax Act of 1981. However, these tax in-
centives alone could not stimulate more capital
formation in plant and equipment without re-
ducing other kinds ofinvestment unless greater
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saving were forthcoming. The Economic Re-
covery and Tax Act of 1981 therefore also con-
tained a reduction ofpersonal income tax rates
by a cumulative 23 percent over three years,
partly on the theory that the resulting decline
in marginal tax rates would stimulate a large
increase in the private saving rate.
The actual outcome has been quite different,
however. "Bracket creep," caused by
nominal incomes, made the actual cut in mar-
ginal tax rates for households considerably less
than 23 percent. Also, a rise in the after-tax
return to saving due to tax cuts may theoreti-
cally eitherincrease or decrease the saving rate;
and since 1981 the private saving rate (personal
plus business) has been relatively stable.1 Fi-
nally, the large budget deficits resulting from
tax cuts and spending increases has meant a
fall, rather than a rise, in the national saving
rate (private plus government). As a result, real
interest rates have been bid up, and capital has
been attracted from abroad. Although foreign
capital inflows reduce the pressure on domestic
real interest rates, the fact remains that these
higher real rates have tended to offset the stim-
ulatory effect of the tax incentives for business
investment.To provide a perspective on the net impact
that the Reagan Administration's fiscal policy
is actually having, this article measures the per-
manent effect offiscal policy oninvestment and
consumption by simulating its effects with an
econometric model. The simulation results in-
dicate that current fiscal policy is actually "pro-
consumption" rather than "pro-investment."
Because the private saving rate is estimated to
be only modestly affected by the tax cuts, the
net effect of the tax cuts has been to stimulate
consumption. The expansion in consumption is
being financed largely by borrowing from
abroad, with the counterpart ofthis being a de-
cline in net exports. The effect on business in-
vestment in plant and equipment is about neu-
tral, as increases in real interest rates almost
exactly offset the stimulus to investment. Cur-
rent fiscal policy, however, is not neutral in its
effects on othertypes ofinvestment as itis tend-
ing to reduce residential and inventory
investment.
The article is organized as follows. Section I
describes a procedure for estimating the per-
manent effect of fiscal policy on the consump-
tion-investment mix. In Section II, the change
in fiscal policy occurring since 1981 is measured
in terms of changes in average tax rates, mar-
ginal tax rates, and expenditures of the federal
government. In Section III, we provide a
thumbnail sketch ofthe econometric model that
is used forsilllulating the effect of this change
i~fis~al policy. This description stresses the re-
sponses of various sectors to real after-tax in-
terest rates. A more detailed description of the
model can be found in the Appendix. Although
this model is relatively small, its key relation-
ships are similar to those embodied in most
large-scale structural econometric models. In
Section IV, we perform two experiments in
counterfactual history, corresponding to two al-
ternative fiscal policies that might have been
followed. The first ofthese shows the effect on
the consumption-investment mix of a contin-
uation of fiscal policy as it existed at the begin-
ning of 1981. In addition, we consider the con-
sumption-investment mix resulting from the
same tax cuts for business, but with no change
in the aspects offiscal policy that affect federal
spending on goods and services and personal
taxes and transfer payments. Lastly, in Section
V we present a summary of the results and
some policy conclusions.
I. Theoretical Analysis of the Effect of Fiscal Policy
When analyzing the effects offiscal policy on
the consumption-investment mix of the econ-
omy, it is important to distinguish between pos-
sible temporary impacts and permanent ones.
The temporary effects of an increase in the fis-
cal deficit depend upon the policy response of
the Federal Reserve. Increased demands for
credit flowing from a larger fiscal deficit put
upward pressure on real interest rates. The
Federal Reserve can temporarily alleviate this
pressure by supplying more funds to the credit
markets through the creation of a larger stock
of money. At some point, however, the expan-
sion of aggregate demand resulting from the
monetary accommodation offiscal deficits gen-
erates a higher level of prices, which then re-
duces the real stock of money and pushes real
interest rates back up. Given the economy's ca-
pacity to produce, the level of real activity will
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ultimately be no different, but real interest
rates will be permanently higher. Alternatively,
the inflationary effects of the fiscal deficit can
be avoided if the Federal Reserve immediately
reduces the stock of money by enough to move
real interest rates to their equilibrium leveL
Over a longer span of time, the economy's
capacity to produce will be altered by the effect
of fiscal policy on supplies of capital and labor.
Ofparticular importance is the supply ofcapital
per worker, and hence real income per capita.
To enhance growth in the stock of capital per
worker, fiscal policy must raise investment rel-
ative to consumption.
The problem can be analyzed more pre~cisely
within the context of an explicit macroeco-
nomic model. For this purpose, we utilize the
well-known IS-LM framework. The IS curve
defines the equilibrium conditions that deter-21Figure 1
ployment, an excess demand for labor drives
up wages and prices until the excess demand is
eliminated. As wages and prices rise, the real
stock of money declines, and the LM curve
shifts to the left, from LMI to LM2. Thus, the
permanent equilibrium generated by the new
fiscal policy is at the same level of real GNP
and a higher interest rate, or Yl and i3•4 In this
equilibrium, the decrease in expenditures pro-
duced by higher interest rates exactly offsets
the original stimulus to expenditures from the
tax cuts.5
The net effect on the composition of aggre-
gate demand depends upon the interest-sensi-
tivity of various types of expenditures in com-
parison to the size of the stimulus that they
received from the tax cuts. For example, if con-
sumption benefits from the tax cuts but is not
at all sensitive to interest rates, various types
of investment would have to contract even if
they had been stimulated by the tax cuts. Or if
only one type of investment spending bene-
fited, the major burden of rising interest rates
would have to faU on other types ofinvestment.
The Federal Reserve can do nothing to
change the permanent effect of fiscal policy on
the real economy. If it tries to peg the interest





mine the demand for goods, and the LM curve
shows the conditions corresponding to equilib-
rium between the supply and demand for
money. By Walras' law, equilibrium in the mar-
kets for goods and money implies equilibrium
credit. inflation is
aUov.'ed to vary in this analysis, for simplicity
and without loss of generality we abstract from
the effects of changing inflationary expecta-
tions and, inflation pn~m:iunls
in interest rates.3
Real rather than nominal interest rates drive
real aggregate spending. But since movements
in real and nominal interest rates are assumed
to be the same in this analysis, the equilibrium
level of real GNP depicted by the IS curve de-
pends only upon the nominal interest rate.
Also, the IS curve includes the adverse effect
of higher interest rates on net exports, and
hence aggregate spending, that operates indi-
rectly through an appreciation of the exchange
rate.
With respect to the LM curve, the demand
for real money balances depends upon the nom-
inal interest rate and real GNP. Given the nom-
inal stock of money determined the mone-
tary authority, the real stock of money varies
inversely with the price leveL The LM curve
assumes a given stock of real money balances
and shows combinations ofthe nominal interest
rate and real GNP that generate an equilibrium
between the supply and demand for real money
balances.
The permanent effect offiscal depends
upon what happens to the consumption-invest-
ment mix at the fun employment level of real
GNP. In Figure 1, we focus on an economy ini-
tially operating at a fun employment level of
GNP, denoted by Yr. Suppose that cuts in per-
sonal and business taxes similar to those un-
dertaken by the Reagan Administration result
in a larger budget deficit. The higher level of
consumption and investment at any
interest rate shifts the IS curve to the right,
from lSI to IS2. If the nominal stock of money
is unchanged, the economy will move to a
higher interest rate and real GNP at iz and yz.
But that is a temporary adjustment. Be-
cause the economy is operating beyond full em-
22tive expenditures, it only generates a greater
amount of inflation. At LM3, the nominal
stock of money would initially be higher than
it was at LM1. The process of inflation would
then proceed until the real stock of money faUs
to LM2. Although the increase in the price
level would be greater than before, the per-
manent level and composition of GNP would
be unaffected. Alternatively, inflation can be
avoided altogether if the Fed reduces the nom-
inal stock of money to shift the LM curve to
LM2 immediately. Whatever the monetary ac-
tion, the permanent effect of a change in fiscal
policy on the composition of GNP is found at
the level of interest rates that generates the
same level of real GNP as before.
This analysis points the way to a procedure
for measuring the permanent effect of fiscal
policy on the economy. The permanent effect
of a larger fiscal deficit is to raise the level of
real interest rates and impact upon interest-sen-
sitive components of aggregate expenditure at
the full employment level of real GNP. This
permanent effect of a change in fiscal policy is
associated with the impact on expenditures of
the difference in real interest rates between the
composition ofexpenditures at full employment
is approximately the same as that which would
occur at neighboring values of GNP.
To simulate the permanent effects of alter-
native fiscal policies that might have been fol-
lowed in the 1981-84 period, we therefore al-
lowed changes in fiscal policy to alter the
composition, but not the level, of real GNP at
each point in time. Real interest rates and the
exchange rate are allowed to adjust to generate
unchanged levels oftotal real spending and real
GNP. The resulting changes in the consump-
tion-investment mix, at historical levels of real
GNP, then become an approximate measure of
the permanent effect of fiscal policy on the
economy.
U. Measuring the Permanent Effect of a Change in Fiscal Policy
This article looks at fiscal policy in terms of
its effects, as opposed to the specific instru-
ments of policy in the form of laws. Fiscal pol-
icy defined in terms ofits effects may be altered
even when there are no legislated changes. The
increase in taxes as a proportion of GNP that
occurs as a result of normal economic growth,
and also from inflation in the absence of tax
indexing, are examples. Conversely, legislative
changes may be required justto keep the effects
of fiscal policy from changing as, for example,
when taxes have to be cut in order to keep rev-
enues from as a fraction of GNP. In this
context, an unchanged policy is one with an un-
changed impact on the composition of eco-
nomic activity at a high level of employment.
From a macroeconomic point of view, an un-
changed fiscal policy has two dimensions.
First, there should be no change in effective
marginal tax rates that would alter economic
incentives. In the structural model ofaggregate
demand that we use for the policy simulations,
the average marginal tax rate for households is
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a component of their real after-tax interest
rates and, therefore, affects expenditures on
consumer durables and housing. Similarly, cor-
porate taxes influence the real cost ofcapital in
the business sector and, hence, expenditures on
inventories and nonresidential fixed invest-
ment. An unchanged fiscal policy would not al-
ter the marginal tax rates that affect these ex-
penditures, and would not shift the IS curve for
this reason.
Second, an unchanged fiscal policy requires
federal outlays and receipts not to change as a
fraction of GNP at a high level of employment.
With unchanged government receipts and ex-
penditures, as well as unchanged effective mar-
ginal tax rates, there would be no shift in the
IS curve. Thus, the composition of aggregate
demand and output would not be affected by
fiscal policy.
It might appear that there could be inconsis-
tencies in this dual criteria for an unchanged
fiscal policy. For example, if marginal tax rates
are higher than average rates, as in fact theygenerally are, normal growth in the economy
with fixed marginal rates would tend to raise
tax receipts as a proportion of GNP. However,
an unchanged fiscal policy-one with a neutral
effect on the composition of GNP over time~
could· be maintained·by reducing.average tax
rates without changing marginal rates. In the
case of personal income taxes, this could be
done by increasing the standard deduction. The
extent of progressivity in the tax structure is
much less for corporations, but here too, the
average tax rate could be reduced without
changing the marginal tax rate on the cost of
new investment.
Marginal Tax Rates
The first dimension of fiscal policy that we
consider is changes in marginal tax rates. As
shown in Table 1, rising nominal incomes com-
bined with a progressive tax system raised the
average marginal personal tax rate from 21.2
percent to 30.4 percent between 1965 and 1980.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 re-
duced personal income tax rates by a cumula-
tive 23 percent over three years. In addition,
top marginal individual income tax rate was re-
duced from 70 percent to 50 percent. However,
the resulting change in the average marginal tax
rate for individuals was smaller because of the
bracket creep caused by rising nominal incomes
overthethree·year period; The tax cuts and
bracket creep combined to reduce the average
marginal tax rate for individuals from 30.4 per-
cent to 27.1 percent by 1984.6 In the experi-
ments in counter-factual history described in
Section III, an unchanged fiscal policy is sim-
ulated by holding the average marginal tax rate
for households at the 30.4-percent level from
1981 through 1984.
The Tax Act of 1981 also contained substan-
tial reductions in effective tax rates on the cost
of business fixed investment without, however,
changing the corporate tax rate on net income.
These tax cuts applied not only to business
plant and equipment, but also to rental hous-
ing. First, the Accelerated Cost Recovery Sys-
tem (ACRS) was introduced, which replaced
the previous system of basing tax lives on ex-
pected useful lives.? For most assets, the new
tax lives are considerably shorter than their
TABLE 1
First Dimension of Fiscal Policy
Average Marginal



























IThis effective tax rate equals 1-u 1 , as discussed in Box 2.
Sources: Barro and Shahasakul (1983), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and Data Resouces, Inc.
24economic lives. Second, the 1981 Tax Act in-
creased tax credits on investment in equip-
ment.8 The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibil-
ity Act of 1982 took back part, but by no means
all, of these tax cuts for business as part of a
package to reduce the size ofthe federal budget
deficit.
The extent ofthe changes in the effective tax
rate on the cost of business fixed investment
before and after the Reagan tax cuts are shown
in Table 1 for equipment, commercial and in-
dustrial structures, and rental housing.9 In the
1950s, the effective tax rates on different types
ofbusiness fixed investmentwere fairly similar.
However, in the 1960s and 1970s, large dispar-
ities developed. The effective tax rate on in-
vestment in equipment dropped as a result of
legislated changes, while tax rates on invest-
ment in commercial and industrial structures
and rental housing went up due to reductions
in the present value of depreciation caused by
25
the higher nominal interest rates accompanying
higher inflation. The Tax Act of 1981 reduced
effective tax rates onthecost ofequity-financed
capital investments by 6 to 20 percentage
points, though it did little to remove the large
disparities between rates on different classes. In
Section III, an unchanged fiscal policy for the
1981-84 period is simulated by keeping effec-
tive tax rates on the various classes of business




When simulating the effects of fiscal policy
changes, it is necessary to consider that ob-
served movements in federal outlays and re-
ceipts are partly due to changes in the level of
economic activity and partly due to other fac-
tors. The federal budget measured on a high
employment basis removes the cyclical varia-tions in outlays and receipts caused by devia-
tions from a.specified highemployment rate of
unemployment.12 The changes in outlays and
receipts that are left are attributable to normal
growth in theeconomy,inflation, orlegislated
':;hanges .••The.ch.anges.·inhigheIllploymentOllt~
lays and receipts that deviate from those re-
quired to maintain a constant proportion to
high •employment GNP constitute•the second
difuensionoffiscaFpolicy.
The federal government's high employment
deficit rose from 0.9 percent ofhigh employ-
ment GNP in1981 to 1.7 percent in 1982, and
to 2.5 and 3.0percentin 1983 and the first half
of 1984, respectively. However, for an un-
changed fiscal policy, federal spendingongoods
and services, transfer payments, and taxes
should be kept at unchanged proportions of
QNP measured on a high.employment basis.
Thus, in.simulating an unchanged fiscal policy
for 1981--84, federalspending ongoods andser-
vices was reduced by the difference between
actual spending and ••whatspendingwpqld have
beenifits ratio to high employmentGNP atthe
beginning..of ••1981 .had.been maintained. As
shown in Table 2 the required adjustment is
small-lessthan $5 billion, in 1972 dollars, in
all but one quarter.13
A similar procedure was used for.adjusting
the level of personal taxes and transfer pay-
ments, and consequently disposable personal
income. Items in the federal budget that affect
the difference between personal disposable in-
come and GNP are separated into two com-
TABLE 2























Percent of Percent of Percent of Percent of
High High High High
Employment Employment Employment Employment
1972$ GNP 1972$ GNP 1972$ GNP 1972$ GNP
1981101 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
02 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 3.9 0.3 6.1 0.4
03 -2.6 -0.2 2.5 0.2 -2.6 -0.2 -0.8 -0.1
04 -3.9 -0.2 5.3 0.3 -5.8 -0.4 -2.8 -0.2
1982/01 -4.0 -0.3 6.2 0.4 0.5 0.0 5.3 0.3
02 0.7 0.0 6.2 0.4 1.4 -0.1 3.7 0.2
03 -4.7 -0.3 7.2 0.4 -15.8 -1.0 10.5 -0.6
04 -11.4 -0.7 8.1 0.5 -25.8 -1.6 -18.6 -1.1
1983/01 -4.7 -0.3 8.3 0.5 -20.6 1.3 -14.5 -0.9
02 -2.0 -0.1 8.6 0.5 -22.6 -1.4 -18.4 -1.1
03 0.5 0.0 9.1 0.5 -38.4 -2.8 -35.0 -2.1
04 4.0 0.2 9.6 0.6 -45.1 -2.7 -41.1 -2.4
1984/01 5.6 0.3 9.3 0.5 -45.0 -2.6 -41.2 -2.4
02 -4.7 -0.3 8.7 0.5 -39.1 -2.3 -35.0 -2.0
26ponents----{;orporate profits taxes and every-
thing else. Corporate profits taxes must be
treated separately because of the interaction
between them and dividend payments, which
feed back to personalincome. Lower corporate
profits taxes •• increase··disposable··perscmalilF
come dollar-for-dollar if the resulting increase
in after~tax corporate profits is all paid out in
dividends, but have no impact on disposable
personal income if it all goes into retained
earnings.
In recent years, dividends have averaged
one-half of after-tax corporate profits. Ordi-
narily, an increase in profits must be sustained
for several yearsfor this 50-percent payout ratio
to be fully realized. However, if firms believe
an increase in profits is permanent because it
has been causedby a change in the tax law, then
the speed ofadjustment would be quicker. Sta-
tistical analysis reveals that the Reagan tax cuts
have, in fact, operated in this way. The ratio of
dividends to after-tax profits was not signifi-
cantly depressed in the 1981-84 period even
though profits soared.
As one component of an unchanged fiscal
policy, the ratio of corporate profits taxes to
GNP on a high employment basis should re-
main the same. To simulate this part of an un-
changed fiscal policy, we reduced the historical
series for disposable personal income by 50 per-
cent of the difference between historical cor-
porate profits taxes and what they would have
been if their ratio to GNP in 1981 had been
maintained on a high employment basis. This
procedure is consistent with the observation
that the payment ofdividends actually adjusted
fairly quickly to maintain the desired long-run
payout ratio.
The remaining items in the federal budget
that contribute to the difference between dis-
posable personal income and GNPtend to alter
disposable income dollar-for-dollar. These ag-
gregate to the sum of personal income taxes,
contributions to social security, and federal in-
direct business taxes less federal government
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transfer payments to persons (including interest
payments) and net subsidies to federal govern-
mententerprises. To simulate an unchanged fis-
cal •policy, the·historical series on·disposable
personal income is, therefore, reduced further
by thedifferellcebetweell.··this aggregate and
what it would have been if its ratio to GNP at
the beginning of 1981 had been maintained on
a·high employment.basis.
As shown in Table 2, the adjustment to dis-
posable personal income becomes very large by
1984.In fact, except for the earlier part ofthe
1981-84 period, the entire stimulus to aggregate
demand from the Reagan economic program
has come from its impact on taxes and transfer
payments,as·opposed to federal spending·on
goods and services. With an unchanged fiscal
policy, disposable personal income would have
been $39.1 billion lower, in 1972 dollars, by the
second quarter of 1984; this difference equals
2.3 percent of GNP.
An additional adjustment is required for fed-
eral grants-in-aid .to state and local govern-
ments. Whereas, for an unchanged fiscal policy
they would stay at the same ratio to GNP as at
the beginning of 1981, by the second quarter of
1984 actual grants-in-aid were $11.2 billion, in
1972 dollars, less than this measure. About 20
percent of this reduction took the form of a
decline in payments to persons, while the re-
mainder was for spending on goods and ser-
vices. It is assumyd that during the time period
studied, other spending and taxes at the state
andlocal level were notaffected. Therefore, for
stimulation of an unchanged fiscal policy the
portion of the adjustment for grants-in-aid
going to persons is added back into personal
disposable income, and the remaining portion
is added to state and local spending on goods
and services. Table 2 shows this adjustment to
state and local government spending on goods
and services and also includes the effect offed-
eral grants-in-aid in the adjustment to dispos-
able personal income.III. A Structural Model of Real Aggregate Demand
In this section, we provide a thumbnail
sketch of the econometric model that is used
for simulating the permanent effects of fiscal
policy,streSsingtesponseSofthevariollsSectors
to real interest rates. A more detailed presen-
tation is provided in the Appendix.14 The the-
ory underlying the model follows. the mainline
neo-Keynesian view embodied in most large-
scale structural econometric models, with par-
ticular attention being paid to the way that real
interest rates enter into the cost of capital for
specific types of investment. In the short run,
the slow speed of adjustment of wages and
prices allows monetary policy to influence real
interest rates, which, in turn, are a prime
mover of aggregate demand through their im-
pact on various types of investment expendi-
tures. Further effects on demand occur through
changes in consumption spending induced by
changes in income and accelerator effects on
investment expenditure. However, in the long-
run real interest rates are determined by the
balance between saving and investment.
The model can be solved for an equilibrium
level of real aggregate demand and output,
given the level of real interest rates and other
exogenous variables. Used in this way, it can
forecast real GNP and its components on the
basis of a projected path for real interest rates.
Alternatively, it can be used with a separate
aggregative forecast of real GNP and prices to
make forecasts ofsectoral activity and the level
of real and nominal interest rates.16 For this
second purpose, one solves for the pathofnom-
inal and real interest rates that produces the
projected path of real GNP. Our exercises in
counterfactual fiscal history employ the latter
approach. We assume the path of real GNP to
be unaffected by alternative fiscal policies since
we are interested only in permanent effects.
A schematic overview ofthe structural model
of aggregate demand is provided in Figure 2.
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The components of expenditure that are af-
fected directly by real interest rates include in-
ventory investment, consumer expenditures on
dllrablegoods,··l"eSiderttial.<construction, .<and
nonresidential fixed investment. Net exports
areinfluenced indirectly through the impact of
the. differentictl between U.S. and foreign real
interest rates on the real exchange rate. The
components of expenditure that are not af-
fected by real interest rates are government
spending on goods and services and consumer
expenditures on nondurables and services. The
latter depends only on permanent disposable
income, and the former is an exogenous policy
variable.
An increase in the fiscal deficit is associated
with increases in government spending, con-
sumption (through personal tax cuts), or iu-
vestment (through business tax cuts), or some
combination ofthese. With a given level of real
GNP, an amount of interest-sensitive private
spending equal to the spending generated by
the increase in the fiscal deficit must be
"crowded out" by a rise in interest rates. Inter-
est rates rise because ofthe government's extra
borrowing in the credit market. The sectors of
domestic investment that get "crowdedout" the
most by a fiscal deficit are those that are most
sensitive to iuterest rates. And whether crowd-
ing out falls more heavily on domestic invest-
ment or foreign investment depends upon the
response ofthe international value ofthe dollar
to real interest differentials between the United
States and other countries.
In the Appendix, we discuss the estimated
responses of the various sectors of aggregate
demand to real interest rates and the real ex-
change·value. of the dollar. An understanding
of the model will help in following the results
of alternative fiscal policy simulations. How-
ever, those who are not interested in further
details at this point can skip the Appendix.29IV. Simulations of Alternative Fiscal Policies
An Unchanged Fiscal Policy
During 1981, there was little difference be-
tween the effects of the Reagan Administra-
tion's fiscal policy and those of an unchanged
fiscal policy. The 5-percentcut in personal taxes
variables are the 6-month commercial paper
rate, the average yield on newly issued AA cor-
porate bonds, the S&P earnings to price ratio
oncommonstocks, andthe real exchange value
ofthe V.S. dollar. The real variables of interest
include total personal consumption expendi-
tures, residential fixed investment, nonresiden-
tiaLfixed investment, and net exports. These
real variables are all measured in 1972 dollars.
The 6-month commercial paper rate directly af-
fects spending on consumer durables and resi-
dential construction, and indirectly affects non-
residential fixed investment through the yield
on bonds and the return to equity. In addition,
the real short-term interest differential between
V.S. and foreign markets drives the real ex-
















Simulations of the permanent effects of al-
ternative fiscal policies are summarized in
graphical form in this section. The historical
errors in each equation of the econometric
model of aggregate demand were first added
back in to allow a simulation of the model to
replicate history exactly. Then, simulations of
two alternative fiscal policies were performed,
allowing interest rates and the foreign exchange
value of the dollar to adjust in such a way that
real GNPwould be unaffected in each period.17
The first of these simulations is for an un-
changed fiscal policy. Itholds marginal tax rates
constant at their values at the end of 1980, cor-
responding to the data in Table 1, and also
makes the adjustments to government spending
on goods and services and disposable personal
income shown in Table 2. Spending ofstate and
local governments on goods and services in-
creases about $9 billion, in 1972 dollars, by the
first half of 1984 because of increased federal
grants-in-aid. But there is virtually no change
in federal spending on goods and services. Dis-
posable personal income is reduced by over $40
billion, in 1972 dollars.
The second of the simulations considers the
degree to which investment spending on plant
and equipment would have been stimulated if
the 1981 tax cuts had been limited to the busi-
ness sector only. For this simulation, the mar-
ginal tax rate for households is held constant at
its value for the end of 1980, but marginal tax
rates on investment in equipment, structures,
and rental housing take on their actual values.
The adjustment to government spending on
goods and services is the same as in the first
simulation; and, as in that simulation, dispos-
able personal income is adjusted downward by
the amount of the tax cut that households oth-
erwise would have received. However, the
downward adjustment to disposable personal
income is less than in the first simulation be-
cause business tax cuts raise after-tax corporate
profits, and hence dividend payments.
We focus particularly on the effects of these
changes on four financial variables and four


















In this simulation, real after-tax interest rates
are reduced to about the same level as in earlier
business cycle expansions. For example, using
the real after-tax 6-month commercial paper
rate as a gauge, its nominal level on a discount
basis would be 6 percent rather than 10 percent
by the first-half of 1984. On an annual yield
basis, and after taking into account the deduct-
ibility of interest costs from personal·income
taxes, .its nominal level would be 4.5· percent
instead of8.1 percent. Subtracting an expected
inflation of around 4.5 percent gives a •real
after-tax commercial paper rate close to· zero
instead ofits actual value of3.6 percent.A year
into prior postwar business cycle expansions,
the real after-tax 6-month commercial paper
rate was also near zero, averaging 0.1 percent.
Thus, currentfiscal policy is having a marked
effect upon real after-tax interest rates. Fur-
thermore, if fiscal policy had not been changed
in 1981, the permanent effect of this would
have been toreduce real interest rates to his-
toricaHy Mrmallevels.·This fact sugggests that
the Federal Reserve has not anowed thefiscal
stimulus to generate much more of an increase
in real GNP than would otherwise have ·oc-





in October was largely offset by bracket creep,
and the business tax cuts had not yet begun to
stimulate business investment.spending. Con-
sequently, as shown in Chart lA,the commer-
cial paper rate corresponding to an unchanged
fiscalpo!icy is little differentfroIl1 the adual
rate during the initial period. After the middle
of1982, however, the effects of the Reagan
Administration's fiscal policy became more ev-
ident. Personal income tax rates were cut by 10
percent in July of 1982 and again in July of
1983. And the liberalization of depreciation
rules and the investment tax credit began to
affect business investment. With an unchanged
fiscal policy, the 6-month commercial paper
rate in the simulation fans 6V2 percentage
points below its historical value by the third
quarter of 1982. The effects of interest rates on
expenditure build over time, however, so that
the difference between the simulated commer-
cial paper rate and its actual value then shrinks.
By the first half of 1984, the simulated com-
mercial paper rate corresponding to an un-
changed fiscal policy averages about 4 percent-
age points less than the actual-at around 6
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inflationary effects of the fiscal stimulus. IS
In the model, arbitrage in financial markets
transmits the reduction in the commercial pa-
per rate to the yield on corporate bonds and
the required return on equity. By the first half
of 1984, an unchanged fiscal policy would have
reduced the AA corporate bond rate by 2.7 per-
centage points (Chart 1B) and the earnings-to-
price ratio on common stocks by 3 percentage
points (Chart Ie). Because prices are un-
changed, the reduction in short- and long-term
interest rates corresponds to a decline in the
differential between U.S. and foreign real in-
terest rates. This produces a substantial reduc-
tion in the real exchange value of the dollar,
even though the effect on the interest differ-
ential is diminished by the tendency, included
in the simulation, of foreign central banks to
match part ofthe movement in U.S. real inter-
est rates. By the first half of 1984, with an un-
changed fiscal policy, the real exchange value
of the dollar in the simulation would be nearly
15 percent lower than it otherwise would have
been, bringing it back to the levels oflate 1981
(Chart 1D).
The effects ofthese changes in financial vari-
abIes on the real variables ofinterest are shown
in Chart 2A-D. According to the simulation, an
unchanged fiscal policy reduces personal con-
sumption expenditures by about $24 billion by
the first half of 1984 (Chart 2A).19 This result
is due to the effect of lower disposable income
under an unchanged fiscal policy, which
strongly dominates the effect of lower interest
rates on spending for consumer durables.
By far, the largest offset to the reduction in
total consumption expenditures with un-
changed fiscal policy is net exports; they are
about $14 billion higher by 1984 (Chart 2B).
The higher net exports are produced by the ef-
fect of lower interest rates in depreciating the
exchange value of the dollar. It is important to
recognize, however, that for reasons unrelated
to fiscal policy (for instance, expectations by
foreign investors of greater monetary stability
in the U.S.), the dollar appreciated by twice as
much between 1980 and 1981 as it did from 1981
and 1984. The lagged effects of this earlier ap-
preciation plus other factors, such as the cycli-
cal position of the U.S. and the effect of LDC
debt burdens in reducing the demand for U.S.
32exports, also depressednetexports. Asa result,
even witllan unchanged fiscal policy, net ex-
ports. would have fallen by $40 billion-or
nearly3 percent ofGNP from the beginning of
1981 to the first half of 1984. Thus, although
fiscalpolicY has had a significant .•effect on net
exports, we estimate that it accounts for only
one-third ofthe decline in this sector since the
beginning of 1981.
We turn next to residential fixed investment
(Chart 2e). The increase in personal tax rates
(issociated with.an unchanged fiscal· policy.di-
rectly reduces the real after-tax interest cost of
mortgage finance, but at the same time, also
reduces personal disposable incomes. Besides
these direct effects, an unchanged fiscal policy
lowers the cost of mortgage credit still further
through its indirect effect in lowering interest
rates in general. The initial effects of an un-
changed fiscal policy on interest rates are larger
than the ultimate effects because of the lagged
response of investment spending and net ex-
ports·to interest rates. The relatively large ini-
tial reductions in interest rates stimulate resi-
dential investment to the extent of $5 billion at
first-about a 12-percent increase. However,
tending to offset this interest rate effect is the
reduction in disposable income associated with
an unchanged fiscal policy. Over time, the re-
duction in disposable income grows, and the
iIl1pactoninterestrates weakens. By the first
half of 1984, the stimulus to residential invest-
ment from an unchanged fiscal policy is only $2
billion.
Offs~tting forces are also at work in the ca.se
of nonresidential fixed investment (Chart2D).
The real cost ofcapital investment in this sector
is equal to a weighted average of real debt and
equity costs. plus the physical rate of deprecia-
tion, all multiplied by one plus the effective tax
rate. The average effective tax rate on the cost
of capital for nonresidential fixed investment
was reduced from 27 to 16 percent by the 1981
Tax Act. An unchanged fiscal policy would
have rescinded this tax cut. But offsetting the
effect of higher business taxes is a lower yield
oncorporate bonds and a lower required return
to equity due to the generally lower levels of
interest rates. This offset is nearly complete























































Tax Cuts for Business Only
As the first simulation clearly shows, the ef-
fectsofreductions in taxes and increases in
transfer payments for households have over-
whelmed the tax incentives provided to busi-
ness.Petsonalincometax cuts have increased
thefederal government's demands for credit by
morethan they raised private saving, thus put-
ting upward pressure on interest rates. The re-
sultisthat real debtand equity costs have risen
by enough to offset the reduction in the cost of
capitaLinvestment in plant and equipment that
would otherwise have occurred.
Since a major objective of current fiscal pol-
icy was to promote capital formation and pro-
ductivity growth, it is interesting to examine the
extent to which business investment would have
been stimulated if current fiscal policy had not
included any net tax benefits for households.
This is the purpose of the second simulation,
which mirrors an unchanged fiscal policy except
that effective tax rates on the cost of business
investment are reduced and corporate profits
are allowed to increase correspondingly.
The results of this policy of tax cuts for busi-
ness only on the commercial paper rate is con-






half of 1984, nonresidential fixed investment is
actually very slightly higher, by $0.6 billion,
with an unchanged fiscal policy compared to
the current fiscal policy, a major objective of
which was to promote higher capital formation
and growth in productivity.
To summarize, the overall longer term effect
of current fiscal policy, compared to an un-
changed one, has been to stimulate consump-
tion rather than investment. At a given level of
real GNP, nearly two-thirds ofthe current stim-
ulus to consumption is being offset by a decline
in net exports, and, consequently, a corre-
sponding decline in net foreign investment. The
remaining offset to higher consumption takes
the form of declines in residential investment,
inventory investment, and government spend-
ing on goods and services. Most strikingly, de-
spite the tax advantages for plant and equip-
ment investment in the 1981 Tax Act,
nonresidential fixed investment actually has
tended to be somewhat lower, rather than
higher, as a result of higher real interest rates.
In aU respects, then, current fiscal policy has
been pro-consumption rather than pro-
investment.
















Tax Cuts for A.
Business Only
1981
are displaced the most, followed by residential
investment and inventory investment.
This simulation illustrates the point that
more saving is required in order to have more
investment. Business tax cuts by themselves are
able to increase investment in plant and equip-
ment partly because foreign saving inflows in-
crease by more than government saving is re-
duced, but also because the increase in plant
and equipment investment comes partly at the
expense of other domestic capital formation. If
we wanted to increase investment in plant and
equipment without contracting other kinds of
capital formation, business tax incentives alone
are not enough. They have to becombined with
reductions in government expenditures and/or
tax increases that boost national saving through
an increase in government saving.













policy in Chart 3A. Compared to an unchanged
fiscal policy, the 6-month commercial paper
rate would be at 8 percent instead of 6 percent
by the first half of 1984. Thus, compared with
an unchanged fiscal policy, tax cuts for business
raise the commercial paper rate, but not to its
actual value of 10.1 percent. The effects on the
corporate bond rate and the return on equity
are similar. The AA corporate bond rises to
12.0 percent from 10.9 percent by the first half
of 1984, but remains below its historical value
of 13.6 percent. The earnings-to-price ratio on
common stocks rises from 6.8 percent to 8 per-
cent, but not to its historical value of 9.8 per-
cent for that period. These higher interest rates
in comparison to an unchanged fiscal policy,
push up the real exchange value of the dollar
about 4 percent, or by about a third of the dif-
ference between its actual value and that cor-
responding to an unchanged fiscal policy.
Personal consumption is initially stimulated
by the impact of the business tax cuts on cor-
porate dividends. But, as the effect on interest
rates builds, expenditures on consumer dura-
bles are depressed to such an extent that by the
first half of1984 total personal consumption ex-
penditures are almost exactly the same as in the
case of an unchanged fiscal policy. Therefore,
any stimulus to spending for plant and equip-
ment must come at the expense of other types
of investment.
As shown in Chart 3B, although nonresiden-
tial fixed investment rises, compared to an un-
changed fiscal policy in this simulation, its in-
crease is limited by the increase in interest
rates. By the first half of 1984, nonresidential
fixed investment is $6 billion, or 3 percent
higher. But this expansion occurs only because
other types ofinvestment are crowded out. Net
exports (and therefore net foreign investment)
35V. Summary and Conclusions
A majorobjective ofthe Economic Recovery
and Tax Act of 1981 was to stimulate greater
capital formation and productivity growth. The
Reagan Administration's original program
called for large tax reductions and even greater
spending reductions to achieve a balanced
budget by 1984. Federal spending on goods and
services actually didn't rise relative to high em-
ployment GNP because cuts in non-defense
spending offset the defense build-up. But the
growth of transfer payments to individuals and
the cuts in personal taxes greatly increased the
credit demands of the federal government.
The result has been a fiscal policy that has
been internally inconsistent for the purpose of
promoting capital formation. On the one hand,
investment in plant and equipment has been
promoted by accelerated depreciation allow-
ances and liberalized investment tax credits that
have reduced effective tax rates on the cost of
capital for this type of investment. On the
other, the cost of capital is being raised by the
effect of large federal demands for credit on
interest rates.
This article has measured the permanent net
impact of these opposing forces by simulating
the effects of alternative fiscal policies on con-
sumption and investment at unchanged levels
of real GNP. Higher capital formation would
eventually boost real GNP at any level of em-
ployment by raising labor productivity. But, for
this to happen, the ratio of investment to GNP
must first be increased. Simulations ofthis kind
tell us whether fiscal policy is working in the
desired direction.
Our simulation indicates that current fiscal
policy is actually promoting consumption rather
than investment. We estimate that the shift in
fiscal policy that has occurred since the begin-
ning of 1981 is having no effect on nonresiden-
tial fixed investment. The reason is that the per-
manent effect of current fiscal policy on real
interest rates is just about equal to the size of
the stimulus from the tax cuts for business in-
vestment. In contrast, the permanent effect of
current fiscal policy on consumption has been
very substantial because of its large boost to
36
personal disposable incomes and the relative in-
sensitivity of consumption to interest rates.
By far the largest offset to the increase in
personal consumption is a decline in net ex-
ports. This decline occurs because the real for-
eign exchange value of the dollar is quite sen-
sitive to the difference between U.S. and
foreign real interest rates. As the fiscal deficit
drives up domestic real interest rates the U.S.
dollar appreciates, which in turn reduces the
volume of net exports. The simulation thus
clearly demonstrates that, in an open economy
with floating exchange rates, the crowding out
of investment by a fiscal deficit primarily takes
the form of a reduction in net foreign invest-
ment or, equivalently, in net exports. Without
this response, we estimate that short-term in-
terest rates would have increased approxi-
mately 3 percentage points more, and the re-
quired return to equity, about 2 percentage
points more. As a result, investment in plant
and equipment actually would have been lower
than with an unchanged fiscal policy.
Since a major objective of current fiscal pol-
icy has been to promote capital formation and
productivity growth, we also examined the ex-
tent to which business investment would have
been stimulated if the current fiscal policy had
not included any net tax benefits for house-
holds. In this simulation, the rise in interest
rates is by more than half. Although these
higher interest rates reduce expenditures on
consumer durables, the increase in disposable
personal incomes due to higher dividend pay-
ments out of larger corporate profits boosts
consumption to the point of leaving total con-
sumption expenditures unchanged. Nonresi-
dential fixed investment does rise under this
policy, but mainly at the expense of net foreign
investment. If we desire an increase in plant
and equipment investment without a contrac-
tion in other kinds of capital formation, busi-
ness tax incentives alone are not enough. They
must be combined with reductions in govern-
ment expenditures and/or tax increases that
boost national saving through an increase in
government saving.Although our simulation estimates only the
permanent, or longer term, effect of current
fiscal policy on real interest rates and the com-
position of GNP, these effects can show up in
the short-run as well if the Federal Reserve is
successful in pursuing an anti-inflationary mon-
etary policy. In such a case, the potential infla-
tionary effects of the fiscal stimulus would be
quickly offset by monetary restraint; and real
interest rates would rise fairly immediately to
their equilibrium level. The current high level
ofreal interest rates and real exchange value of
the dollar bear a strong resemblance to the sim-
ulated, longerterm, effects ofcurrentfiscal pol-
icy. In fact, we estimate that real interest rates
would now be close to historically normal lev-
els, at currentlevels ofreal GNP, if fiscal policy
had been unchanged since 1981. This suggests
that the Federal Reserve has not allowed the
fiscal stimulus to generate much more of an in-
crease in real GNP than would otherwise have
occurred, consistent with a policy of offsetting
the inflationary effects of the fiscal stimulus.
Appendix
This Appendix describes the structural model
ofreal aggregate demand in greater detail, and
explains the estimated reponses of the various
sectors of aggregate demand to real interest
rates and the real exchange value ofthe dollar.
Table A.1 brings these estimates together. Each
ofthe main sectors ofaggregate demand is con-
sidered in turn.
Nonresidential Fixed Investment
The equations for nonresidential fixed in-
vestment follow the neoclassical theory of in-
vestment, as developed by Jorgenson.20 In the
neoclassical theory, capital is viewed as being
substitutable for other factors ofproduction, so
that firms respond to the relative price of cap-
ital in making their decisions to invest in capital
goods. The per period payment for the use of
a capital good is its "rental," or "user," cost,
which was discussed in Box 2. Firms invest in
fixed capital to bring their actual stock of cap-
ital into alignment with their desired stock,
which, in turn, depends upon final sales and
capital's rental cost.
Firms finance about one-third of fixed in-
vestment with debt and two-thirds with equity
capital. In the model, a permanent increase of
one percentage point in the weighted average
of the real after-tax bond rate and the return
to equity would currently depress real invest-
ment in equipment by $3.8 billion in 1972 dol-
lars, or 2.8 percent, and reduce investment in
structures by $1.5 billion in 1972 dollars, or also
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by 2.8 percent after 11 quarters. Both the real
after-tax bond rate and the return to equity re-
spond strongly to movements in the real short-
term interest rate. A one percentage point
change in the real short-term interest rate
moves the real after-tax corporate bond rate by
47 basis points after 11 quarters, and the return
to equity by 63 basis points.
Inventory Investment
Inventory investment in the model follows a
stock adjustment process, modified by the ef-
fects ofsurprises in sales.21 Such surprises result
in unintended investment or disinvestment.
The desired stock of inventories relative to
sales depends upon the real after-tax short-term
interest rate. However, the speed ofadjustment
is much faster than for business fixed invest-
ment. One-half of the adjustment is estimated
to occur within one-quarter, and over 90 per-
cent ofit within a year. A one-percentage point
increase in the real after-tax short-term interest
rate is estimated to reduce inventory invest-
ment by $2.1 million in 1972 dollars at current
values of sales, or by 11 percent, within the
current quarter.
Personal Consumption Expenditures
Consumption functions in this model are
based upon Friedman's (1957) permanent in-
come hypotheses. Permanent income is an an-
ticipated long-run measure of income. The dif-
ference between permanent and currentincome is caned transitory income. Permanent
disposable income is calculated as a 16-quarter
distributed lag on current disposable income,
with geometrically declining weights. Accord-
ing to the permanent income hypotheses, the
flow ofconsumptionis simply a function ofper-
manent disposable income. In the case of the
consumption of nondurables and services, ex-
penditures are approximately the same as the
flow of consumption, and so depend only upon
permanent income. However, for durables,
consumption expenditures and the flow of con-
sumption are quite different;
TABLE A.1
Estimated Response to a One Percentage Point Change in a
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2Expenditures on consumer durables are
viewed as following a stock-adjustment process,
in which the desired stock of durables depends
upon permanent income and the relative price
of durables. The most volatile part of the rel-
of interest. Also, any windfall of transitory in-
come acts to speed up the stock-adjustment
process.22 The normal elimination of a discrep-
ancy between the desired and actual stock of
durables requires a reduction in financial sav-
ing, which may be limited by the fact that much
financial is contractual. In contrast, a
windfall of transitory income can be spent rel-
atively rapidly on desired durables without de-
creasing the accumulation of financial assets.
According to estimates of the model, about
60 percent of transitory income ends up being
spent on consumer durables after 3 quarters.
Thus, movements in current income can signif-
icantly alter expenditures on consumer durables
through the allocation of transitory income,
even though permanent income is affected very
little. The proportional effect of the real after-
tax short-term interest rate on expenditures for
consumer durables is weaker than in other sec-
tors. A one-percentage point increase in this
rate, if sustained for 3 quarters, depresses
spending on consumer durables by $2.4 billion
in 1972 dollars at current levels of income, or
by 1.4 percent.
Residential Fixed Investment
Residential investment is also assumed to fol-
Iowa stock adjustment process in the context
of the permanent income hypothesis. The de-
sired stock ofhousing depends upon the size of
permanent income and the rental cost ofcapital
for housing. Because the tax treatments of
owner-occupied housing and rental housing dif-
a weighted average of the rental cost of
capital for the two types ofhousing units is em-
ployed.23 The real after-tax, short-term interest
rate affects the terms of mortgage credit,
which, in turn, enter into the rental cost ofcap-
ital. We estimate that a sustained I-percentage
point increase in the real, after-tax short-term
int,erest rate reduces residential construction by
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$3.2 billion in 1972 dollars at current levels of
income, or by 5.4 percent, after 3 quarters.
Also, the model suggests that nearly all of the
transitory disposable income that is not spent
on consumer durables is spent on housing.
uses dummy variables to capture the impact of
periods of disintermediation at financial insti-
tutions that were caused by Regulation Q ceil-
ings on· the interest paid on deposits. As de-
posits dropped off when market interest rates
rose above Regulation Q ceilings, the availa-
bility of credit to housing was restricted to a
greater extent than indicated by the market
level of real interest rates.24 However, by the
end of 1983, deposits subject to Regulation Q
interest rate ceilings constituted only 21 percent
of all small time and savings deposits at banks
and thrifts. Consequently, at the present time,
the effect of tighter credit conditions on resi-
dential construction works almost exclusively
through movements in market levels ofreal in-
terest rates.
Wojnilower (1980) and some other financial
market analysts have argued that monetary pol-
icy's ability to control spending is greatly weak-
ened by the reduced effectiveness ofRegulation
Q. This view holds that the demand for credit
is highly inelastic with respect to interest rates,
and that it is subject to volatile expectations.
Extraordinary and unacceptable increases in in-
terest rates that are damaging to the health of
financial institutions are needed to slow credit
demands. However, our estimates indicate
that, even in the absence of effective Regula-
tion Q ceilings, the response of residential con-
struction as well as other types of activity to
changes in real interest rates is very substantial.
Net Exports and the Real Exchange Rate
Since the shift in 1973 to the managed float-
ing of exchange rates, real interest rates have
had an additional channel of influence on ag-
gregate demand. An increase in real interest
rates generates capital inflows that cause the
real value of the dollar to appreciate. This, in
turn, reduces the contribution of net exports to
the level of aggregate demand.25Exports are modeled as a function ofthe rest
ofthe world's GNP and the real exchange value
of the dollar, on a trade-weighted basis. Im-
ports are related in a similar fashion to U.S.
GNP and the real exchange value ofthe dollar.
The influencesofGNPon exports andimports
are mostly contemporaneous. However, the re-
sponses of exports and imports to changes in
the real exchange value ofthe dollar take much
longer, with significant effects lasting for 7
quarters. As earlier studies have found, the re-
sponse of exports is greater than that for im-
ports.26 A sustained one-percentage point in-
crease in the real value of the dollar at current
levels of income is estimated to reduce exports
by 1.7 billion in 1972 dollars, or by 1.2 percent,
and to increase imports by .7 billion in 1972
dollars, or by 0.5 percent.
The approach to modeling the real exchange
value of the dollar follows the asset of view of
the exchange market. In this view, asset prices
adjust quickly to clear the foreign exchange
market, and expectations playa central role in
the determination of the short-run equilibrium
exchange rate. Trade flows help mainly to tie
down long-run expectations and also may influ-
ence demands for assets in some degree.
27 The
basic equilibrium condition in this view is that
the expected percentage change in the ex-
change rate over any period equals the differ-
ence between nominal returns on securities at
home and those abroad with maturities of the
same period. If this condition does not hold,
investors will bid the value ofthe exchange rate
to the point where it does. It is easily shown
that a similar relationship would hold between
the expected change in the real exchange rate
and the difference between the real returns on
40
securities. Thus, an increase in real interest
rates in the United States raises the real value
of the dollar to the point where its expected
depreciation in the future is equal to the dif-
ferential between U.S. and; foreign real interest
rates.
According to our estimated model, a I-per-
centage point change in the real short-term in-
terest rate differential in favor of the United
States, sustained over a period of 11 quarters,
raises the real exchange value of the dollar by
a full 8 percentage points. Also, at current lev-
els of income, an unanticipated increase in net
exports of 1 billion in 1972 dollars appreciates
the dollar by 0.4 percent by causing the ex-
pected value of the real exchange rate to be
revised upward to that degree.
Finally, the model takes into account the re-
sponses of foreign central banks to movements
in U.S. real interest rates. In the periodofman-
aged floating, it is estimated thatforeign central
banks have tended to respond to each I-per-
centage point change in the U.S. real short-
term interest rate with a 40-basis point change
of their own. Moreover, we estimate about the
same response during the 1981-84 period. This
kind of partial response tends to minimize the
impact of changes in U.S. real interest rates on
foreign GNP. If, for example, a fiscal deficit in
the U.S. produces higher real interest rates and
therefore leads to an appreciation of the U.S.
dollar, net exports from foreign countries
would increase, creating inflationary pressures
abroad. However, if foreign real interest rates
rise to partially match the change in U.S. rates,
foreign investment expenditures would be re-
duced; and this would tend to stabilize real ag-
gregate demand and GNP abroad.FOOTNOTES
1. Existing research on the relation between the saving
rate and tax incentives is well summarized in Chapter 3 of
Bosworth (1984). The stability of the private saving rate
since 1981 is discussed in Bisignano (1984).
2. Initial budget cut proposals prepared by the Office of
Management and Budget, a report on the proposed tax
reductions issued by the Treasury, and the White House
paper discussing the four major elements of the program
are contained ina paper issued by the Executive Office of
the President (981).
3. Inflation premiums in interest rates have actually been
highly variable in recent years. For a way of incorpprating
variable inflation premiums into the standard IS-LM frame-
work, see Keran (1984).
4. Estimates differ as to the time required for the full ad-
justment of prices and complete "crowding out" of interest-
sensitive expenditures by fiscal. policy in the absence of
any change in nominal money. According to the St. Louis
reduced-form model ofAnderson and Carlson (1970), such
full crowding out takes place within 4 quarters.However, in
the different reduced-form model of McElhattan (1982) it
takes 5 or 6 years before real GNP returns to its original
level. Similar differences also exist in estimates from large
structural models. In the FMP model used by the staff of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the length
of time required for full crowding out, given nominal money,
is 2 to 4 years; but for some other structural models it is
much longer. See Ando and Modigliani in Stein (1976) and
Fromm and Klein (1973).
5; Presumably the Administration's plan was to increase
the proportion of investment relative to consumption to se-
cure more growth over time. Even if the fiscal deficit is
accompanied by lower marginal tax rates that stimulate
work effort and thereby increase the level of full employ-
ment GNP, the effect on the consumption and investment
mix of the economy would be similar although total eco-
nomic activity would be increased. In terms of Figure 1, the
leftward shift of the LM curve resulting from either mone-
tary policy or price adjustments would be less if full em-
ployment GNP were raised compared to the case where
full employment output is unchanged.
6. Estimates of the average marginal tax rate for individ-
uals are from Barro and Shahasokul (1983). Updates for
1981-83 were obtained from the Economic Research
Group of Goldman Sachs. The figure for 1984 was esti-
mated by the author.
7. Under ACRS, any depreciable asset falls into one of
four classes and is given a tax life of 3, 5, 10, or 15 years.
These shorter tax lives were effective immediately, Clnd de-
preciation schedules were to become more accelerated
during a five yar phase-in period. But the latter change was
rescinded in 1982.
8. Before 1981, 10 percent of the value of investment in
equiPment could be deducted from corporate taxes for
equipment with a life of 7 years or more. A 3-to-6 percent
deduction could be taken on equipment with lives of be-
tween 3 and 7 years, and no investment tax credit was
allowed on equipment with a life of less than 3 years. The
1981 Tax Act gave equipment with a recovery period of up
41
to 3 years a 6 percent investment tax credit and all other
equipment a 10 percent credit. However, in 1982 allowable
depreciation on all equipment was reduced by 50 percent
of the investment tax credits taken.
S.The \Jl'ldeflyil1~l"allles()fll,i, Cll1dkWereestimCltedby
Data Resources, Inc. and the staff of the Board ofGover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System.
10. For the derivation, see Jorgenson (1963) or Hall and
Jorgenson (1967).
11. The effective tax rate on equity financed investment is
not the same as the effective rate of taxation on all in-
vestmentbecause a portion is .financed by debt and nom-
inal interest costs on debt are deductible from the corpo-
ration's taxable income. Thus, for example, while the
current effective tax rate on equity-financed nonresidential
fixed investment averages about 14 percent (derived from
a weighted average of Table 2), the effectiverate of taxa-
tion on all such investments is near zero. See Auerbach
(1983).
12. For the empirical analysis, we use the high employ-
ment bUdget estimates, based on a 6 percent unemploy-
ment rate, that are maintained by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis of the Department of Commerce. Recently, the
Bureau has developed a cyclically adjusted bUdget based
on the realized trend in real GNP, rather than an estimate
of potential output at a specified unemployment rate. This
has the advantage of automatically allowing for demo-
graphic and other changes that may affect the unemploy-
ment rate associated with full employment. However, use
of this approach for relatively recent years requires a fore-
cast of future real GNP to generate the trend, which intro-
duces a different kind of uncertainty. Since the full employ-
ment rate of unemployment probably has not changed
much over the 1981-84 period, the high employment
budget based on a 6 percent unemployment rate was cho-
sen. For descriptions and estimates of these two versions
of the high employment budget, see de Leeuw, et al (1980)
and de Leeuw and Holloway (1982, 1983).
13. The detailed breakdown of the high employment
budget at a 6 percent unemployment rate thatis used to
derive this and other elements of Table 2 is provided in
Holloway (June 1984, September 1984).
14. For a complete description, see Throop (1984).
15. Examples of such large scale neo-Keynesian models
include Eckstein (1983), Evans (1969), and Federal Re-
serve Board (1983).
16. Reduced-form models capable of making such fore-
casts of real GNP and the price level include Anderson and
Carlson (1970) and McElhattan (1981).
17. Actual values of real GNP could not be reproduced
exactly in each period due to the dynamics of the model.
Real interest rates and the exchange rate affect aggregate
demand with distributed lags. Thus, only a fraction of the
total effect of these variables on aggregate demand occurs
in the first period. To offset a large change in fiscal policy
exactly, as for example in 1982.3 and 1983.3, a very large
change in real interest rates would be needed. However,
in subsequent periods, the lagged effects of the initially
large change in interest rates would have to be offset, re-quiring further large movements of interest rates in the op-
posite direction. To reproduce real GNP in each period
could require larger and larger changes in interest rates
over time.
This is an example of the general problem of instrument
instability. See, for example, Holbrook (1972). The resulting
cycles could imply negative values .for interest rates and,
in any case, would make it difficult to compare the longer
term impacts of different fiscal policies. A degree of
smoothing of interest rates was therefore required. Still, the
average deviation of simulated GNP from historical GNP
for the entire 1981-84period is less than $3 billion, in 1972
dollars; by the first half of 1984, the average deviation is
less than $1 billion.
18. This point can be demonstrated by referring to Figure
1. Starting from a historically normal level of interest rates
at i1 and Y1 and considering the shift in the IS function from
lSi to IS2 due to the tax cuts, suppose that real GNP is
allowed to increase, say along LM1 with a given (real)
money supply, to Y2' Then the interest rate corresponding
to an unchanged fiscal policy of lSi at Y2 would be below
the normal level at i1• But ifthe Federal Reserve prevented
higher inflation in the short-run by a policy action to shift
the LM curve from LM1 to LM2, then the interest rate cor-
responding to an unchanged fiscal policy would be the
same as the normal level i1, as actually observed.
19. Since the simulated change in consumption, and con-
sequent impact on interest rates, is the single most impor-
tant effect of the change in fiscal policy, the results are
sensitive to the form of the consumption function. As ex-
plained in the Appendix, consumption in the model is a
function of permanent disposable personal income and real
after-tax short-term interest rates. Permanent disposable
income is measured by a 16-quarter distributed lag on ac-
tual disposable income. This is a fairly standard formula-
tion, but other approaches are possible. Most of these al-
ternatives would make the impact of the change in fiscal
policyon consumption and interest rates even greater than
indicated in the present simulation.
First, if households anticipate their tax changes to be per-
manent, their perceived permanent income may change
more qUickly than the adaptive construction based on a 16-
quarter distributed lag. Second, if the public includes cor-
porate earnings in its notion of permanent income, whether
paid out in dividends or not, the effect of the tax cuts for
business and households on consumption and interest
rates would be somewhat greater than indicated here be-
cause of the additional effect of retained earnings on per-
manent income. Third, and extending household rationality
somewhat further, households may perceive that the infla-
tion premiums in interest payments on the federal debt are
in reality the repayment of principal in real terms, and so
should be saved. Thus, changes in disposable income due
to changes in these inflation premiums would not affect
consumption.
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This last hypothesis has as its counterpart the notion of
the inflation-adjusted high employment budget, which re-
duces the high employment deficit by the rate of inflation
multiplied by the privately held stock of federal debt. See,
for example, Cagan (1981) and Eisner and Pieper (1984).
The increase in the inflation-adjusted high employment
bUdget deficit between 1981 and 1984 was even larger
than the change in the unadjusted high emplqyment budget
because of the decline in inflation, implying a greater effect
on cqnsumption. It shifted from a surplus equal to 1.3 per-
cent of GNP to a deficit of 1.6 percent, compared to a
change in the unadjusted deficit from 0.9 percent of GNP
to·3 percent. However, the stability of the private saving
rate contrasts with the behavior of saving that would be
consistent with this inflation adjustment to the budget. As
inflation and inflation premiums on government debt rose
in the 1970s, the private saving rate should have in-
creased. More recently, as inflation has declined, the pri-
vate saving rate should have fallen. In practice,however,
the private saving rate appears to have been relatively im-
pervious to these influences. See Bisignano (1984).
In yet another alternative view ofthe consumption function,
personal tax cuts would have little or no effect on con-
sumption and interest rates. This is the ultrarationality hy-
pothesis recently argued by Barro (1974), in which a tax
cut causes households to raise their saving rate in order
to pay the higher taxes that will be required for servicing
the government debt in the future. In this case, all of a tax
cut would be saved so that there would be no effect what-
soever on consumption. However, empirical studies of
short-run consumer spending do not generally support this
view. See Buiter and Tobin (1979) and Feldstein (1982).
20. The basic theory and its application are described in
Jorgenson (1963) and Hall Jorgenson (1967, 1971).
21. The classic papers on this type of investory model are
Metzler (1941), Lowell (1961), and Darling (1959).
22. On the role of permanent and transitory income in the
stock adjustment process for consumer durables, see Jus-
ter and Wachtel (1972) and Darby (1975).
23. For a useful discussion of the application of the neo-
classical theory of investment to owner-occupied and rental
housing, including the specific taxes applicable to these
sectors see Ott, Ott, and Yoo (1975).
24. For a theoretical demonstration of this point, see Lom-
bra (1984).
25. The classic works emphasizing this link are Fleming
(1962) and Mundell (1963).
26. See, for example, Feldman (1982) and Warner and
Kreinin (1983).
27. The approach used is basically a simplification of
Hooper and Morton's (1982) extension of the sticky price
monetary model of exchange rate determination developed
by Dornbusch (1976) and Frankel (1979). For a general
survey of the asset view of exchange rates, see Shafer
and Loopesko (1983).REFERENCES
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